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Abstract We propose a paleoeconomic coevolutionary explanation for the origin of speech
in modern humans. The coevolutionary process, in which trade facilitates speech and speech
facilitates trade, gives rise to multiple stable trajectories. While a ‘trade-speech’ equilibrium
is not an inevitable outcome for modern humans, we find it is a relatively likely scenario given
our species evolved in Africa under climatic conditions supporting relatively high population
densities. The origin of human speech is not independent of economic institutions—the eco-
nomics of early human trade can provide additional insight to help explain the physiological
emergence of human speech.
Keywords Evolution · Language · Coordination game · Early humans · Paleoeconomics
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1 Introduction
Human speech allows for superior communication and is one of the primary reasons our
species has been so successful. But why the morphology for human speech evolved remains
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a mystery (Holden 1998).1 Most agree the explanation must be partly behavioral, as the
evolutionary benefits of human speech (i.e., improved communication) primarily stem from
improved social interactions (Knight et al. 2000). But what behaviors would have made the
morphological investments worthwhile, and how did this evolutionary process occur?2 In this
paper we develop a paleoeconomic theory of the coevolution of trade and speech, whereby the
tradeoffs associated with each investment jointly influence the evolutionary and behavioral
outcomes.3
Investments in human speech morphology were costly. These investments, which were
in place between 150,000 and 200,000 B.P. (Lieberman 1998; Holden 1998), involved
changes in the upper respiratory system—specifically the supralaryngeal vocal tract (SVT).
One change was a descended larynx, which increased choking risks. Previously humans
could breathe and drink or consume small amounts of food simultaneously, without choking
(Lieberman 1984). Another change involved the loss of a “snout”, which increased the curva-
ture of the airway and reduced aerobic efficiency (Lieberman 1984). Lieberman (Liemberman
2007) indicates that only humans (Homo sapiens) have a human SVT; all other hominids had
a “standard plan” SVT, resulting in vocal limitations relative to Homo sapiens.4
What behaviors could have led to this investment? Several theories exist, though detailed
evidence of hominid behaviors from the period of morphological evolution is difficult to
unearth (Holden 1998). A popular theory is vocal grooming. This theory is based on the
observation that primates “groom” each other to help support relationships, which suggests
speech could enable larger, more stable communities by allowing each individual to “vocally”
groom more people (Dunbar 1996). But others counter that vocal grooming is “cheap” rel-
ative to physical grooming (or other forms of non-vocal signals) and may be unreliable (see
Knight et al. 2000; Dessalles 2000). Moreover, this and other theories based on cooperation
1 There is also a question of when speech emerged. Unequivocal evidence of spoken language does not exist
until about 40,000 B.P., long after the morphology for human speech was in place (Holden 1998). Lieberman
1984, Liemberman 2007) argues this gap between morphology and cultural evidence is a chimera—the mor-
phology had to evolve for speech because it was simply too costly otherwise. Others agree that speech is
a biological adaptation (Pinker and Bloom 1990), arguing that our present day inability to find convincing
historical evidence best explains this time lag (Holden 1998). Corballis (2002) suggests the morphology could
have initially been used to produce songs useful in some sexual selection process, and that speech emerged
later. But he acknowledges (as do many others) that proto-speech would have been used in conjunction with
hand and facial gestures during this morphological evolution.
2 Investments in human speech required cognitive and morphological adaptations. Many cognitive adaptations
came first. Paleoneurologists indicate the Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas of the brain, which are now important
in language production, processing and comprehension, evolved as far back as Homo habilis (2.5–2 million
B.P.; Wilkins and Wakefield 1995). It is believed these areas evolved to support conceptual abilities associated
with tool making and use, and gestural communication (Paillard 2000; Wilkins and Wakefield 1995). Though
their initial purpose was not to support speech, these and other cognitive adaptations eventually would have
supported primitive speech (Paillard 2000; Wilkins and Wakefield 1995), referred to as proto-speech, as early
as 500,000–1.5 million B.P. (Knight et al. 2000). These adaptations also formed the neural preconditions for
more complex speech (Paillard 2000; Wilkins and Wakefield 1995). We take earlier cognitive adaptations and
primitive speech abilities as given and focus on morphological adaptations.
3 Within the scope of the paleoeconomics field are fundamental scientific mysteries like the evolution of
humans and human behaviour (Hansson and Stuart 1990; Galor and Moav 2002; Robson and Kaplan 2003;
Rogers 1984), early human resource management and food procurement strategies (Smith 1975; Brander and
Taylor 1998; ?; Bulte et al. 2006; Marceau and Myers 2006; Weisdorf 2005); the importance of biogeography
(Olsson and Hibbs 2005); and the emergence of trade, early markets and property rights (Ofek 2001; Lagerlöf
2005). The common process of these models is to highlight behavioral explanations by introducing formal
economic modeling into research fields like anthropology and archaeology traditionally dominated by more
descriptive approaches.
4 The extent of these limits cannot be known entirely without more information about the shape and descent
of the non-human species’ tongues (Liemberman 2007).
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do not address the co-evolution of the behavior and human speech morphology.5 That is,
they do not consider morphological changes and the associated physiological costs; rather
they focus on the selection of speech or language as a behavior, implicitly assuming the
morphology is already in place.
More recently, Ofek (2001) and Robson (2005) have described how increased biologi-
cal complexity, such as human speech morphology, can arise due to a Red Queen game—
a coevolutionary arms race between competitors seeking an evolutionary advantage. Ofek
(2001) discusses how human speech might arise from a verbal arms race driven by a uniquely
human activity—competition for trading partners in a market exchange system (i.e., exchange
between non-family members). Here the best communicators gain the relative trading advan-
tage. Robson’s (2005) social intelligence theory features within-species competition as the
key co-evolutionary factor in the verbal arms race (as does Ofek).
But could competition for trading partners have been the driving force? Not necessarily.
Some evidence exists suggesting that trading networks among early modern humans existed
by at least 130,000 B.P. (Holden 1998), and Ofek (2001) provides convincing arguments that
it occurred much sooner—perhaps 1.5–2 million B.P.6 This suggests hominids were already
trading by the time the morphological adaptations for speech were underway. But the data is
insufficient to suggest the widespread trading needed to generate significant competition for
trading partners. More likely, trading was emerging during this time frame and the difficulty
was not getting someone to trade with you over someone else, but rather to get anyone to
trade with you at all. Emerging trading systems can be modeled as a cooperative activity in
which trading only emerges through coordination (e.g., Williamson and Wright 1993).
When trade is modeled as a cooperative activity, multiple equilibria are possible due to
strategic complementarities—more trade by one agent increases another agent’s gains from
trade. Hominids must coordinate their decisions to capture gains from trade that outweigh
the associated transactions costs, such as those arising from communication barriers. Coor-
dination succeeds under the right bioeconomic circumstances and sufficient expectations for
this outcome (Diamond 1982; Williamson and Wright 1993). Coordination failure, however,
arises when the trading equilibrium fails to emerge due to insufficient expectations (Cooper
and John 1988).
When viewed in a coevolutionary framework, the results for our model in this paper sug-
gest the gains from trade can make nature’s investments in communication worthwhile, which
further increases the gains from trade. But human speech and trade are not guaranteed, as
multiple equilibria may arise due to potential coordination failures. Bioeconomic conditions,
5 Some scholars have suggested that the believability of signals can be improved via costly rituals (Knight
1998; see also Noble 2000), social contracts (Deacon 1997; see also Gifford 2002) or rules of kin selection or
spatial selection (Livingstone and Fyfe 2000). Another theory is that speech evolved as a knowledge transfer
mechanism (Pinker and Bloom 1990), though free-riding, deception, and cheating could make reliance on
second-hand information an unreliable strategy for evolutionary success (e.g.,Knight et al. 2000). A third
cooperative theory is based on production—that speech emerged, though possibly after the morphology was
in place, to free up hands otherwise used to communicate through gesture or to converse in the dark (e.g.,
Corballis 2002). The literature on the evolution of altruistic behaviors and social institutions is substantial; see
Bowles et al. (2003) for a recent analysis.
6 Ofek (2001) notes that members of the Homo lineage are the only primates to abandon the “feed-as-you-go”
strategy and bring food back to a central hub, where it could be redistributed among family and non-family
members (Gamble 1999). The redistribution process, at least for earlier hominids, is called “food sharing”. But
this relatively “warm and fuzzy” term obfuscates the redistribution process. Isaac, who pioneered the notion of
communal food consumption, says (1993, p. 535), “The food-sharing model has been widely misunderstood
as implying…friendly, cuddly, cooperative human-like hominids. This need not be so.” He goes on to suggest
food-sharing is really a behavioral system that facilitates exchange. Ofek suggests the term “redistribution”
or “exchange” replace the term “food sharing”.
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including geography and the rate of evolution, may also affect which outcome arises. In par-
ticular, we find that speech is less likely to evolve the slower is the evolutionary rate of speech
relative to the trading system. This is essentially the Red King effect described by Bergstrom
and Lachman (2003): the faster player (hominids in this case) loses the evolutionary race, in
contrast to the Red Queen effect in which the faster competitor wins. But with more favorable
geography, speech and trade may always emerge.
Lieberman (1984) theorizes that multiple evolutionary equilibria did occur as Homo hei-
delbergensis speciated into Neanderthals (Homo neanderthalensis).7 He indicates some SVT
changes likely occurred in Homo heidelbergensis that allowed for (i) mouth breathing, which
increased aerobic efficiency and created a selective value for physical activities, and (ii)
proto-speech (primitive speech abilities), but not human speech. At this point there could
have been evolutionary gains from further investments in muscular ability (due to more effi-
cient respiration under a non-linguistic morphology) or improved speech capabilities. But the
physiologies of these investments are at odds since they involve different uses of the upper
respiratory system.
Neanderthals evolved to become more robust and stronger than modern humans (Klein
2003; Trinkhaus and Shipman 1993; Lovejoy and Trinkhaus 1980). Lieberman (1984, 2007)
suggests Neanderthals did not evolve a human SVT (though the jury is still out on their vocal
skills; Krause et al. 2007).8 Moreover, Bruner (2004) indicates the parietal development of
early modern humans differed from Neanderthals (and earlier hominids). The human parietal
developments, which evolved around the same time as the human SVT (or perhaps in response
to it), would have enhanced “visiospatial integration, sensory integration, multimodal pro-
cessing, and social communication” (p. 299). In terms of behavior, there is evidence that
Neanderthals likely did not engage in trade to the same extent as modern humans (Tattersall
and Schwartz 2000; Tattersall et al. 1998; Kuhn and Stiner 1998; see also Horan et al.
2005). Tattersall (personal communication) suggests that modern socio-economic behaviors
are expressions of a generalized underlying capacity that was recently acquired and which
Neanderthals did not have.
Our discussion proceeds as if Neanderthals did not have human vocal abilities or trade,
though our analysis does not actually require that this was the case. Our model generates
multiple equilibria, and it is certainly possible that the conditions for attaining the speech-
trade equilibrium were met by Neanderthals. But if Neanderthals did not have these traits, the
multiple equilibria arising in our model might help to explain this. Moreover, when viewed
alongside Horan et al.’s (2005) theory that Neanderthals went extinct due to inefficiencies
caused by their lack of trade relative to humans, our model addresses the natural follow-up
7 Scientific classification of the hominid phylogeny has changed in recent years due to new molecular find-
ings (e.g., Ward and Stringer 1997). Lieberman (1998) refers to Homo erectus as the direct ancestor to both
Neanderthals and H. sapiens, and Ofek (2001) refers to early H. sapiens as the immediate predecessor to both.
The Smithsonian Institute (2005b) states, “For many years, scientists placed any problematic specimens dis-
playing mixtures of “erectus-like” and “modern” traits into a confusing category: “Archaic” Homo sapiens…
Recently, it has been proposed to separate these individuals into a distinct species. For this purpose,…the
specimen name Homo heidelbergensis has seniority.” Previously, H. heidelbergensis was the generic name
given to the first hominids in Europe (Gamble 1999). Although H. erectus is now viewed on a different lineage
than H. sapiens and Neanderthals (Smithsonian 2005a), many of the works cited here still refer to H. erectus
as the immediate ancestor to both.
8 There is indirect evidence that Neanderthals, who supported a complex culture (Gamble 1999), had prim-
itive speech (Lieberman 1984). Neanderthal brains were also larger than those of modern humans (Corballis
2004), indicating the potential cognitive capacity for speech (Lieberman 1984, 2007). But (Lieberman 1984,
2007) indicates that a Neanderthal skull could not have supported a human SVT.
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question of why some species trade and others do not.9 In doing so, we also formalize Mellars
(2004) speculation that complex language was the key to human success over Neanderthals.
2 Hominid biology
Consider N individuals (or households) of hominids (say H. heidelbergensis) living on an
area of size K . Following conventional population growth models (McGehee and Armstrong
1977; Dobson 2004), define per capita growth of the population, or net per capita fertility, by
N˙/N = G = −d + b(N )F (1)
where d is the mortality rate, bF is the birth rate, F represents per capita consumption, and b
is a density-dependent birth rate parameter (with bN < 0). Density-dependent growth implic-
itly accounts for resource availability, which is likely to differ in different geographies (e.g.,
different latitudes). We return to the geographic issue in the numerical simulation of Sect. 4.
Equation 1 indicates the population grows when nutrition is consumed at a rate greater than
a subsistence level, defined as S = d/b.
2.1 The role of SVT morphology
We now introduce SVT morphology into our model, accounting for the tradeoffs this mor-
phology implies between vocalization and strength.10 Define the variables v and s to represent
the physiological traits of vocalization and strength. We model these two traits as functions of
an underlying physiological trait, denoted by the scalar I ∈ [0, 1]. I can be thought of as the
degree to which the SVT has evolved towards the human SVT: larger values of I represent
a greater degree of vocalization and less strength, while smaller values of I represent less
vocal ability and greater strength. Vocalization is given by the continuous function v(I ), with
vI > 0. Denote strength by s(I ), which is decreasing in I (sI < 0).
These traits enter per capita growth as follows. Mortality is increasing in vocalization (dv >
0) because the associated drop in the larynx leads to a greater risk of choking (Lieberman
1998). The birth rate parameter is decreasing in mass (bs < 0). Larger animals tend to
have lower birth rates, as more energy is required to support greater mass, diverting energy
flows away from reproductive activity.11 Subsistence requirements are increasing in muscle
mass and in vocalization, so that greater vocalization (I > 0) has an ambiguous impact on
subsistence requirements.
9 Indirectly, our model is a logical complement to Robson’s (2005) social intelligence model and Robson and
Kaplan’s (2003) theory of coevolutionary investments in intelligence and longevity. Their approaches differ
from our model, although we expect these investments could be related in that brain development allows
for more sophisticated and clever communication, provided one also has the vocal ability to articulate these
superior ideas.
10 We do not specifically model investments in intelligence via the parietal lobe. These could have occurred
along with or as a result of speech and trade coevolution. But many other factors besides these were also likely
involved, and it is impractical to attempt to model everything (in our Discussion Section we explore in more
detail how the tradeoffs associated with SVT morphology investments likely compared to those of intelligence
investments). Robson’s (2005) discussion of social intelligence theory suggests that competition for resources
among hominids likely led to increased intelligence via the Red Queen effect. This effect could have been
heightened once trade became more prevalent.
11 This is generally true across species, and so it should also be expected to hold as one species (e.g.,
H. heidelbergensis) evolves into another (e.g., H. sapiens).
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The SVT also affects production and exchange, both of which affect F . Each individual is
assumed to produce Y (s) in each period, with stronger individuals producing more (Ys > 0).
Also, we describe in the next section that individuals who seek to trade with others incur
transactions costs associated with searching for a potential trading partner and communi-
cating about a trade. These costs are denoted T (v, n), where n = N/K represents hominid
density. Assume Tv < 0 and Tn < 0: improved vocal ability reduces communication costs,
and a denser population reduces search costs. Here F depends on both v and s (as well as
N ).
3 Exchange with transactions costs: static and dynamic models
Per capita population growth, G, is influenced by whether individuals choose to participate
in exchange/trade. For notational ease, we model trade implicitly through a “reduced-form
approach” (see Horan et al. 2005 for an explicit model of paleo-trade). Each hominid is a
potential trader. An individual’s economic decision is whether to produce and consume only
his own output (nutrition), or to specialize and trade with others. An individual who nei-
ther specializes nor trades produces and consumes a nutrition level of Y (s). Someone who
specializes and trades consumes Y (s) + Z − T (v, n), where Z represents the gross gains
from trade relative to the no specialization/no trade scenario.12 The net gains from trade are
endogenous in our model, even if the gross gains are a parameter, because population den-
sity enters the model through its attenuating effect on transaction costs. Transactions costs
arise because individuals who decide to trade must search for a potential trading partner and
then communicate about a trade. For simplicity, assume an individual who incurs these costs
finds one potential trading partner (the first person he meets) with certainty and attempts
to trade with only this person; no additional searching occurs if a trade does not occur.13
An individual who specializes but is unable to find a trading partner consumes κY (s) − T ,
with κ ∈ (0, 1): while specialization increases the production of nutritional components for
which he specializes, a lack of variety in the absence of trade generally decreases aggregate
nutritional value.
Whether a trade ultimately occurs depends on whether the potential trading partner is will-
ing to trade. Denote σ ∈ [0, 1] to be the trading strategy adopted by others in the population,
i.e., the overall likelihood that a person he meets will trade. A trader consumes nutrition of
Y +Z −T with probability (or belief) σ , and he consumes nutrition of κY −T with probability
1 − σ , so that his expected consumption level is σ(Y + Z − T ) + (1 − σ)(κY − T ).
3.1 Hominid strategies and strategic complementarities in a one-shot game
What proportion of the population will search for a trading partner? In the next section we
model the decision to trade as a dynamic process that adjusts via replicator dynamics. But
12 These exogenous gross gains could be modeled to be even greater when more people participate in the
market, i.e., Z = Z(σ N ), with Z ′ >0. Again adding this feature unnecessarily complicates the model without
affecting the primary results. We can also derive our results from the implicit trading using a more notationally
complex Ricardian trade model, though again this unnecessarily complicates the model without affecting our
primary results.
13 At the end of the period there is a limited window of opportunity to trade your output (or else it goes bad,
or else it gets dark, etc.). Assume two people meet with certainty and this is the only opportunity to trade, but
all the results spill over (again with more notational clutter) if instead we assume specialists can potentially
meet Q people (as opposed to one).
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first we use a one-shot game to illustrate the fundamental concepts underlying the dynamic
model.
We assume individuals are homogenous in terms of physiologic traits, but that their behav-
ioral choices may differ. An individual hominid makes choices to maximize net fertility,
which in our model is consistent with maximizing nutrition. Each individual i(i = 1, . . . , N )
decides on a trading strategy, denoted by ρi ∈ [0, 1], which represents the probability he
searches for a trading partner. His expected consumption is given by
Fi = ρi (σ [Y (s) + Z − T (v, n)] + [1 − σ ][κY (s) − T (v, n)]) + (1 − ρi )Y (s). (2)
In a one-shot game, the optimal choice of the trading probability, ρi , is determined by taking
the derivative of Fi with respect to ρi
∂ Fi
∂ρi
= σ [Z + (1 − κ)Y (s)] − T (v, n) − (1 − κ)Y (s). (3)
The right hand side (RHS) of (3) is the expected net gain from trading. If one decides to trade,
he incurs transactions costs and a loss of aggregate nutrition with probability one, but he has
a chance to recoup the nutritional losses and earn an additional gain with probability σ .
If the RHS of (3) is negative, then the optimal decision is not to trade: ρi = 0. In a
symmetric Nash equilibrium, ρi = σ = 0 and there is no trade. This outcome always occurs
when transactions costs exceed the gains from trade, T > Z ; and it may occur even when
Z > T . Z > T is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the RHS to be non-negative;
the possibility exists for some trading to occur. If the RHS is strictly positive, ρi = 1 and
in a symmetric Nash equilibrium everyone always trades (ρi = σ = 1). In this case, (3)
reduces to Z − T > 0. If Z > T and the RHS of (3) vanishes, then ρi ∈ (0, 1) and in
a symmetric Nash equilibrium we have ρi = σ = σˆ = (Yˆ + T )/(Yˆ + Z) < 1 where
Yˆ = (1 − κ)Y (s). Assuming Z > T , the ultimate equilibrium depends on expectations of
the individuals. A person wants to mimic others: trade if others trade; no trade if others do
not trade; and randomize his trading behavior if others randomize.
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between ρi and the relative transactions costs, T/Z . For a
given value of T/Z, each individual’s expectations about the trading behavior of others must
lie on or above the σˆ curve for a trading equilibrium to emerge. As the relative transactions
costs are increased, a trading equilibrium is less likely; it can only arise if there are sufficient
expectations for trading. Finally, no trading occurs when relative transactions costs are suffi-
ciently large, or T/Z > 1. Any one of three equilibria could be realized as long as T/Z < 1,
and so exchange is not guaranteed. We focus on the cases in which T/Z < 1, such that all
equilibria have a chance to emerge.
The interior equilibrium strategy, which can be written as σˆ = [T/Y + (1 − κ)]/[Z/Y +
(1−κ)], is the ratio of costs to expected benefits. This means the equilibrium trading strategy
σˆ is reduced when the relative benefits of trading are increased. This result seems counter-
intuitive in a static sense, but the intuition becomes clear when dynamic adjustments are
considered. In a dynamic context, which we explore in the following section, σˆ represents a
line of unstable equilibria as indicated by the phase arrows in Fig. 1. If σ > σˆ , the σ = 1
equilibrium emerges; if σ < σˆ , the σ = 0 equilibrium arises. Anticipating future results, we
note the basin of attraction for trade increases as transaction costs fall (e.g., when population
densities are higher or when geographical conditions for supporting human populations are
more favorable).
Multiple equilibria may arise when there are strategic complementarities between the
individual’s strategy and the strategies of others (see Cooper and John 1988; Kiyotaki and
Wright 1993; Williamson and Wright 1993; Krugman 1991). The trading strategies of the
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Fig. 1 Interior equilibria of the static model (with phase arrows drawn in to indicate the need to consider
dynamics)
individual, ρ, and the others, σ , are strategic behavioral complements when the derivative
∂2 Fi/(∂ρi∂σ ) = Z + (1 − κ)Y (4)
is positive, which it always is: the marginal returns to one person’s actions are increased
when there is an increase in the others’ actions (accordingly, this is a supermodular game;
Levin 2003). We adopt the terminology of strategic behavioral complements, as opposed
to the more standard term strategic complements, to distinguish between hominid strategies
and evolutionary strategies, which we discuss below.
We now carry the notion of strategic complementarities to the evolutionary scale, with
hominid choices depending on the evolution of trait I and vice versa. Consider the impact
of increased vocalization strategies on the benefits of trading strategies. Differentiating (3)
we see the derivative
∂2 Fi/(∂ρi∂ I ) = −TvvI − (1 − σ)(1 − κ)YssI (5)
is positive: vocalization increases the marginal benefits of trading, and so vocalization is a
strategic coevolutionary complement to trading.14
3.2 Replicator dynamics for the trading strategy
Since the static model provides no intuition into how strategies evolve over time or whether
equilibrium strategies are stable, we reformulate the model as a dynamic one. Population
dynamics are again given by Eq. 1. Again we assume physiologically homogenous individ-
uals, and we assume a symmetric trading strategy σ . The replicator dynamics for the trading
strategy take the form (Rice 2004; Bergstrom and Lachman 2003):
14 In the evolutionary game theory literature, it is common to say that nature does strategize (e.g., Rice 2004),
although technically this is inaccurate. Rather a selection process occurs within the natural system that makes
it seem as if nature chooses a strategy to maximize fitness. If we take this realistic view, it is more appropri-
ate to say vocalization is a joint evolutionary complement to trading (as opposed to a strategic evolutionary
complement).
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σ˙ = α (σ [F∗T − F∗] + (1 − σ)δ
) = α (σ(1 − σ)[∂ F/∂ρ] + (1 − σ)δ)
= α (σ(1 − σ)[σ Z − T (v, n∗) − (1 − σ)(1 − κ)Y (s)] + (1 − σ)δ) (6)
where FT denotes expected consumption under trade (defined by (2) with ρ = 1), F is mean
consumption in the population (defined by (2) with ρ = σ), and δ > 0 is a strategy muta-
tion parameter. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) indicates the speed of adjustment. Without loss
of generality, assume cultural frictions (e.g., induced by traditions, communication difficul-
ties, or historic hostilities) slow changes in hominid strategies so these evolve on a slower
time scale than does N . We capture this friction by assuming N attains its equilibrium value
prior to adjustment: the superscript (∗) denotes that N is evaluated at the steady state value
N∗(Fenichel 1979 discusses dynamic systems involving fast-time and slow-time variables;
see Grimsrud and Huffaker 2006, for a bioeconomic application). While this is not a necessary
assumption, it helps us highlight the tradeoffs between trading and vocalization strategies.
Equation 6 indicates individuals increase their trading strategy if doing so leaves them bet-
ter off on average. We also assume there is a constant but small rate δ of mutating one’s strategy
towards trading (see Foster and Young 1990; Rice 2004). This mutation prevents the system
from settling at the autarky corner (where σ = 0): small efforts to trade may be sustained as
σ →0. The effect of the mutation term diminishes and ultimately vanishes as σ → 1.15
Three equilibrium strategies arise from (6) when Z > T : (i) a stable autarkic equilibrium
with nominal trade supported by mutation,σ = [(Yˆ+T )−
√
(Yˆ + T )2 − 4δ(Yˆ + Z)]/[2(Yˆ+
Z)], (ii) an unstable equilibrium, σˆ = [(Yˆ + T ) +
√
(Yˆ + T )2 − 4δ(Yˆ + Z)]/[2(Yˆ + Z)],
and (iii) a stable trading equilibrium, σ = 1. Note σ = 0 and σˆ = (Yˆ +T )/(Yˆ + Z) (the line
of interior equilibria in Fig. 1) when δ = 0. These stability properties stem from the strategic
behavioral complementarities. With δ small, ∂ F/∂ρ ≈ 0 when σ = σˆ . As σ increases from
this point, ∂ F/∂ρ > 0 (since ∂2 F/[∂ρ∂σ ] > 0) and σ˙ > 0. The opposite occurs as σ is
reduced from σ = σˆ .
Holding I fixed, the equilibrium ultimately attained depends on the initial trading strat-
egy, denoted σ(0) = σ0. The equilibrium σ emerges whenever σ0 < σˆ , and σ = 1 arises
whenever σ0 > σˆ . The threshold level σˆ depends on the population density, n∗, through the
impact of density on transaction costs. Specifically, σˆ ′(n∗) < 0; so trade is more likely to
take off and establish itself in geographic regions that support denser populations.
We have shown the establishment of trade depends on initial expectations and environ-
mental considerations (as some environments initially support greater densities). Trade also
depends on SVT physiology, I . Until now we have held I fixed, but over time this can
adjust and affect σ˙ . Increases in I will generally increase the marginal benefits of trad-
ing, ∂2 F/[∂ρ∂ I ] > 0, (vocalization is a strategic coevolutionary complement to trading),
increasing the basin of attraction for the trading equilibrium.
3.3 Adaptive dynamics for the vocalization strategy
Consider the evolution of the human SVT, which we call nature’s vocalization strategy.
Following the convention of the evolutionary game theory literature as applied to quantitative
15 Accordingly, when we introduce coevolution with I in the next section, a small mutation term is gener-
ally insufficient to create a snowball effect of run-away vocalization. Note we could also include a term for
mutation away from trading (e.g., a small mutation rate of γ so that the term σγ is subtracted from Eq. 6),
but this would complicate the algebra without impacting on the dynamics when σ is small—the focus of our
attention since this is the region where there exists the greatest uncertainty about the emergence of trading.
The only significant impact of incorporating mutations away from trading would be to prevent the system
from equilibrating at the full trade corner, σ = 1.
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genetics, assume nature does strategize (Rice 2004), although technically this is inaccurate.
Rather, a selection process occurs within the natural system that makes it seem as if nature
chooses a strategy to maximize fitness, G. We describe below how this choice of strategy
depends on the level of trade. We also define the level of trade necessary to affect human
speech evolution, and the lack of trade necessary to affect muscular evolution.
Mutations in I follow a process of adaptive dynamics (Brown and Vincent 1987; Rice
2004). A strategy for I is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if
∂G∗
∂ I




Following Diekmann and Law (1996), Lande (1979), and Krakauer and Jansen (2002), the
evolution of the trait I is specified as follows:




where µ is the mutation rate of I, φ is the speed of adjustment, and using (2), G∗ is given by
G∗ = −d(v) + b(s, N∗)F∗. (9)
The interpretation of parameter φ is analogous to that of the adjustment parameter α intro-
duced in (6); but if φ is sufficiently greater or smaller than α, the trading and mutation
processes occur at different time scales. If φ is very small relative to α, trading dynamics
are fast and mutation dynamics are slow; here the superscript (∗) in (8) and (9) applies to
both the trading strategy σ and the population N . If φ and α have similar magnitudes, the
superscript (∗) only applies to N . If φ is very large relative to α, trading dynamics are slow
and mutation dynamics are fast. For now, assume φ and α are of similar magnitudes; in our
numerical simulation later in the paper we explore how changes in the relative magnitudes
affect the dynamics.
From (8), trait I attains a steady state when ∂G∗/∂ I = 0, or when proportional net
growth (G∗) is maximized as is required by (7). Otherwise, there are increases in vocal-
ization (strength) when the marginal product of the trait on fitness is positive (negative).
Interestingly, investments in vocalization depend on the trading strategy. To see this, differ-

























where ∂ F∗/∂ρ is as defined in (3), ∂2 F∗/(∂ρ∂σ) is as defined in (4), and ∂2 F∗/(∂ I∂ρ) is
as defined in (5).16 The first RHS term is of the same sign as the expression in brackets,
which consists of the marginal impact of an individual’s strategy on his own consumption
(∂ F∗/∂ρ, which may be positive or negative) plus the weighted (by σ) strategic behavioral
complementarity effect of others’ strategies on his consumption (σ∂2 F∗/(∂ρ∂σ), which is
positive). Assuming δ is sufficiently small, ∂ F∗/∂ρ ≥ 0 when σ ≥ σˆ , in which case the first
bracketed term is positive; the term can be negative if ∂ F∗/∂ρ is sufficiently negative.
The second RHS term in (10) has the same sign as the expression in brackets, which
consists of the strategic coevolutionary complementarity effect of vocalization on trade
16 The derivatives in expression (10) are taken prior to imposing the equilibrium condition ρ = σ . If the
equilibrium condition was imposed first, then the expression in the first set of brackets would be written
∂ F∗/∂σ and the expression in the second set of brackets would be written ∂2 F∗/(∂σ∂ I ). We have written
the derivatives in the current form to highlight the role of strategic complementarities.
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(∂2 F∗/(∂ρ∂ I ), which is positive) plus the weighted marginal impact of an individual’s
strategy on this complementarity (σ∂3 F∗/(∂ I∂σ∂ρ) = σ(1 − κ)YssI < 0). When σ is
sufficiently small (i.e., trade has only just emerged), then σ(1 − κ)YssI is small and the
overall bracketed term is positive. Even when σ = 1, the overall term is positive if increased
vocalization has greater marginal impacts on transactions costs than on output weighted by
(1 − κ). Finally, the third RHS term in (10) reflects the impact of an increase in σ on the
equilibrium population level N∗, which may be positive or negative but is presumably small
if the net gains from trade are small.
Assuming the final two terms in (10) are positive or negligible, trading is a strategic
coevolutionary complement to vocalization (∂2G∗/(∂ I∂σ ) > 0), provided the individual’s
marginal benefits of trading (∂ F∗/∂ρ) are positive or not too negative. In this case, an
increase (decrease) in the trading strategy reinforces the incentives to increase (decrease) the
vocalization strategy and vice versa. Sufficient levels of trade could therefore be a necessary
condition for evolution into modern humans, while a sufficient lack of trade could lead to
Neanderthal-style evolution.
In contrast, if the individual’s marginal benefits of trading are sufficiently negative,
∂2G∗/(∂ I∂σ ) may be negative. Trading would be a strategic coevolutionary substitute to
vocalization in this case (increasing the trading strategy reduces the benefits of vocalization),
although vocalization remains a strategic coevolutionary complement to trading. The net
result is that a hominid society could become trapped in an equilibrium involving low levels
of trade and vocalization, as the investment incentives are not self-reinforcing.
4 Simulation
We now use a simulation (specified in Table 1) to show the two ways in which the trade-
vocalization equilibrium can emerge in our model. The equilibrium can emerge (1) due to
favorable initial conditions in the presence of multiple equilibria caused by adverse geo-
graphic conditions supporting small population densities, or (2) as a globally optimal solu-
tion such as when geography supports “sufficiently” large population densities. In the case
of multiple equilibria, the key influence on the necessary initial conditions is the relative
speed of adjustment of speech and trade. When the evolutionary speeds are asymmetric (i.e.,
α = φ), the Red King effect kicks in for better or worse, depending on initial conditions.
4.1 Scenario A: poor geography and multiple equilibria
We consider two scenarios in which the local geography does not support dense populations.
Scenario A, illustrated in Fig. 2, represents a situation in which both strategies, ρ and σ ,
evolve along an identical time scale, i.e., φ = α. Three equilibria emerge: x is a locally sta-
ble, autarkic-strength equilibrium; y is a saddle-point equilibrium; and z is a locally stable,
vocal-trade equilibrium. The saddle path, denoted by S, is the only trajectory that leads to
y. But the probability the system is initially on that path is essentially zero. Therefore, y is
effectively unstable and S separates the phase plane into two basins of attraction: one for x
and one for z.
All points above S are on trajectories leading to z. The reason is that, in this region of the
phase plane, vocalization and trade are bi-lateral strategic coevolutionary complements of
sufficient magnitude as to overcome the hominid coordination failures. Vocalization and trad-
ing strategies strongly reinforce each other in this region, making z locally stable. Contrast
this outcome with what happens in the absence of coevolution. Suppose society is initially at
123
304 J Econ Growth (2008) 13:293–313
Table 1 Simulation model equations and parameter values
Biological process Equations Parameter values Notes
Vocalization v = v0(1 + v1 I ) v0 = 0.5
v1 = 1
Strength s = s0(1 − s1 I ) s0 = 1
s1 = 0.75
Mortality d = d0(1 + d1v) d0 = 0.07
d1 = 0.15
Birth b = b0(1 − b1s) − b2 N b0 = 0.35
b1 = 1.2
b2 = (b0 y(s(0.5)) − d0)/
(y0k)
b2 is the density-dependent
fertility term, calibrated at
an initial equilibrium (i.e.,
where G = 0) with mid-
range level of strength, I =
0.5, so that initial output at
this point is y(s(0.5)),
k = 0.7 for Scenarios A
and B;
k is the carrying capacity,
expressed as a density
k = 1.0 for Scenario C
Output Y = Y0s Y0 = 0.5
Transactions cost T = T0(1 − v)/(N/K ) T0 = 1
K = 1
Gains from trade Z = 0.75
Mutation rate µ = 1 The impact of µ cannot be
separated from that of φ, as
the effective speed of adjust-
ment is µφ
Speed of adjustment α = 0.0002 in Scenario A; Our discussion of the speed
of adjustment is centered
around the separatrices,
which do not exist in Sce-
nario C
α = 0.02 in Scenario B
φ = 0.0002























Fig. 2 Scenario A—symmetric evolutionary dynamics
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point a. If I were fixed, the trade trajectory would follow the dotted trajectory to a low trade
equilibrium on the σ˙ = 0 isocline. Alternatively, suppose society started at point b, and let
σ be fixed. Now I would follow the dotted trajectory until it equilibrates at a lower level of
vocalization on the I˙ = 0 isocline. This implies the introduction of coevolution allows both
trading and vocalization to evolve from either of these points along the solid trajectories to
equilibrium z. Coevolution generally improves the outcome.
In contrast, all initial points below S follow trajectories to x . The local stability of x in
this region of the phase plane occurs because trade and vocalization are not strong strategic
coevolutionary complements to one another. As a result, the reinforcing incentives are small.
The increased trading incentives that come from increased vocalization are not enough to
overcome the hominid coordination failures. Moreover, if people trade less then incentives
for nature to invest in vocalization decline. The hominid society gets stuck in an autar-
kic-strength equilibrium. We again contrast this outcome against one without coevolution.
Suppose society is initially at point c. If I were fixed, the trade trajectory would follow the
dotted trajectory to σ = 1. Alternatively, suppose the initial point is d and σ is fixed. Now I
would follow the dotted trajectory to I = 1. Coevolution here results in the solid trajectories
leading to equilibrium x ; coevolution generally worsens the outcome.
Hominids (as a group) prefer equilibrium z to x , whereas nature is indifferent between
these equilibria since G∗ = 0 holds at each equilibria. While the basin of attraction for z
is large, getting there requires sufficient hominid coordination—a sufficiently large σ0. The
required value of σ0 diminishes as vocalization (I0) is increased, but some positive value of
σ0 is always required to enter the basin of attraction for equilibrium z.
4.2 Scenario B: poor geography, multiple equilibria, and the Red King effect
Scenario B (Fig. 3) captures the same situation as Scenario A except now we assume asym-
metric coevolution, in which the trading strategy evolves faster, i.e., φ < α. The effect is to
rotate S clockwise, shrinking the basin of attraction for the hominids’ preferred equilibrium
outcome, z.17 This is the Red King effect described by Bergstrom and Lachman (2003)—the
basin of attraction for the slower (faster) player’s preferred outcome expands (shrinks). Intu-
itively, the smaller basin of attraction results because the faster player’s effective “bargaining
power” is diminished.18 In our problem, less of the isosector located to the left of the σ˙ = 0
isocline remains in the basin of attraction for z. The trading strategy is diminishing over time
in this region. When this decline occurs relatively quickly it increases the downward pull
toward equilibrium x—the greater speed enhances the downward effect caused by coordina-
tion failures, overwhelming the counteracting upward effect caused by the complementary
17 In the limit as φ → 0 (vocalization dynamics are extremely slow relative to trade dynamics), vertical
movements seem to occur instantaneously relative to horizontal movements. In this case, the northwest sep-
aratrix S is defined by the northwest portion of the σ˙ = 0 isocline, and the southeast separatrix S becomes
vertical and tangent to the σ˙ = 0 isocline at the point where the isocline bends backwards. Finally, note that S
rotates counterclockwise relative to Fig. 1 when hominid trade evolves more slowly than nature (α < φ). We
do not investigate this case formally, but the results and intuition will be the opposite of that explained here.
18 The Red King effect emerges when two players are involved in a mutualism (a cooperative endeavor in
which both players stand to gain) and one player’s strategy evolves slower than another’s. The intuition offered
by Bergstrom and Lachman (2003)for the Red King effect is as follows. Each player involved in the mutualism
prefers to be selfish, but as there are multiple equilibria the process of getting to one’s preferred outcome is
akin to bargaining for that outcome. In Schelling’s (1960) early discussion of bargaining, a player stands to
gain if his hands are tied by constraints originating from within his clan. This is the so-called Schelling con-
jecture, in which national negotiators can bargain harder in international agreements when they have domestic
constraints they must satisfy. In evolutionary game theory models, a slower speed of adjustment effectively
ties one’s hands.
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Fig. 3 Scenario B—asymmetric evolutionary dynamics
impact of greater vocalization. That is, the relatively larger value of α effectively reduces
the strategic coevolutionary complementarities of vocalization on trade. Moreover, the faster
reduction in trade reduces the incentives for vocalization. Together, these forces expand the
basin of attraction for x .
That the faster player’s preferred basin of attraction is diminished leads Bergstrom and
Lachman to conclude that the fastest player loses a Red King game—the opposite of the
antagonistic coevolutionary Red Queen game in which the fastest player wins. But they rec-
ognize that this global result does not necessarily hold for each smaller region of the phase
plane. While reducing the relative value of φ in our model reduces the overall basin of attrac-
tion for z, portions of this basin actually expand in regions where there has already been
sufficient speech (or proto-speech) development—specifically, to the right of the right-hand
arm of the saddle path S. Initial conditions matter. Since sufficient vocal abilities exist already
in this region, less initial trade (possibly zero) is required to move to the vocalization-trade
equilibrium. Moreover, the faster player wins in this region, similar to the Red Queen effect,
but for a different reason. The intuition is the reverse of what we discussed earlier. The larger
basin of attraction occurs in the region where the trading strategy is increasing over time (i.e.,
σ˙ > 0). Here, the relatively greater speed at which the trading strategy increases intensifies
the upward pull acting on both strategies, effectively increasing the strategic coevolutionary
complementarities and expanding the basin of attraction for z.
To sum up, when multiple equilibria exist and if trade evolves fast relative to vocalization,
then (i) more initial trade is needed to get the coevolutionary process rolling towards z, at least
when there is low initial vocalization, and (ii) less initial trade is needed to move the system
towards z when there is a sufficient initial level of vocalization (or proto-speech). One can
only speculate as to what the exact initial conditions were, but we know that some degree of
proto-speech did exist. If this level were sufficient, trade could take hold even if initial rates
were low or zero. But what level of proto-speech is sufficient? The answer depends on the
underlying biological and environmental parameters. Geography could have mattered; better
geographical conditions will shift the isoclines in ways that expand the basin of attraction
for z. We now turn to a scenario in which geographical conditions are improved so much that
the trade-vocalization equilibrium is globally stable.
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Fig. 4 Scenario C—Better Geographic conditions
4.3 Scenario C: favorable geography and a globally stable equilibrium
Now consider a geographic region that supports a denser population. The larger densities
reduce transactions costs of trading relative to less favorable geographies, increasing indi-
viduals’ marginal benefits of trading. For lower levels of vocalization, the autarkic equilibrium
strategy, σ , is increased and the unstable equilibrium strategy, σˆ , is reduced. For greater lev-
els of vocalization, both of these equilibria disappear (the discriminant of σ and σˆ becomes
negative) so that only the trading equilibrium σ = 1 remains.
Scenario C (Fig. 4) represents a geographic region that exhibits a 20% larger population
carrying capacity K (all other parameter values are identical to those in Scenario A). The
larger marginal benefits of trade shift the σ˙ = 0 isocline to the left. These larger marginal
benefits also increase the marginal benefits of vocalization, though the effect on the I˙ = 0
isocline is small. The net result is that a bifurcation results relative to Scenario A, as the iso-
clines no longer intersect and the vocalization-trade equilibrium z becomes globally stable.
Given our parameters, the bifurcation occurs with about a 25 % increase in K from the base-
line. While this value is simulated, it does suggest the follow pattern—if either environmental
or cultural conditions or both improve to support greater hominid densities, a threshold is
crossed such that speech via trade emerges as a stable global equilibrium.
4.4 Implications for divergent speciation
The differences between Scenarios A & B and A & C may help explain the distinct evo-
lutionary outcomes of Neanderthals (strong, non-traders with limited vocal abilities) versus
humans (weaker, traders with advanced vocal abilities). Earlier we established that lowering
the transaction costs of trade increases the basin of attraction for the speech-trade equilibrium.
This is confirmed in the numerical analysis—we find for some parameter values the speech-
trade outcome is inevitable. Trade could have emerged for more favorable initial expectations
about trading, or it could have emerged in regions where cultural changes (i.e., adoption of
trade) occurred more rapidly such that initial expectations did not matter as much (as in Fig.
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3). In Scenario C, however, initial expectations do not matter—only environmental condi-
tions as created by the geographic region matter. Better geographic conditions support greater
human densities, and as a consequence, the system settles at z.
Our model predicts the speech-trade equilibrium of modern humans is more likely to be
the outcome for species with high population densities (due to favorable geography). Were
densities of the direct ancestors of Homo sapiens in Africa actually greater than densities
of the direct ancestors of European Neanderthals? While knowledge about prehistoric pop-
ulation densities is scant, there is reason to believe this was the case. Humans evolved in
Africa, in a relatively warm and stable climate. In contrast, Neanderthals lived under more
brutal circumstances—making a living in Eurasia in the grip of an ice age. Binford (2001),
for instance, estimated populations of hunter–gatherers by ecological zone during the Meso-
lithic (admittedly a more recent period), based on gradients of diminishing prey availability
and growing season as one moves away from the tropics, and the pattern of his findings is
consistent with the notion that hominid densities would have been greater in Africa. Keeley
(1988) also finds that population density in hunter–gatherer societies is negatively correlated
with latitude. Firming up the linkage between speech and trade, Keeley notes only societies
with high population densities develop complicated culture characterized by, among other
things, “standard valuables or currency” which would enable trade to operate efficiently
(p. 405).19
We close this section with two speculative observations. First, it is conceivable that our
analysis of the why of the origin of speech also sheds light on the when question. If the
co-evolutionary process involving trade is responsible for the development of speech, it is
possible the emergence of speech coincides with (or shortly follows) a sudden increase
in pre-human population densities in Paleolithic times. This would not be unprecedented.
For example, Stiner et al. (1999, p. 190) conclude “human population densities increased
abruptly during the late Middle Paleolithic and again during the Upper and Epi-Paleolithic
periods.” The model predicts that such growth pulses are conducive to the evolution of
speech—population shocks, induced by climate or custom, could cast the system into the
basin of attraction of the speech-trade equilibrium.
Second, once trade and vocalization take sufficient hold of the population so the system
begins to close in on z, then migration into regions that support smaller population densities
(e.g., represented by a shift in the isoclines that alters the system from Scenario C [Figure
4] to Scenario A [Fig. 2]) will not send the population back to equilibrium x . This raises the
possibility that humans crossed into Europe without losing any of these abilities.
5 Discussion
The origin of human speech is one prominent paleo puzzle in modern science. Our proposed
explanation is based on the idea of strategic complementarities that result in multiple stable
development trajectories—one path gives rise to modern humans, the other gives rise to a
muscular species with limited speech capacities (perhaps Neanderthals). Key elements in
our model are (i) one’s decision to trade affects the returns to similar decisions taken by
other agents, (ii) transaction costs are influenced by vocalization abilities, and (iii) trading
decisions affect the morphological evolution of humans—favoring investments in muscles
or vocalization. Taken together these three elements create conditions favorable for speech
19 Keeley (1998) uses the term “complex” in reference to the particular type of culture being described here,
but for consistency we stick with Gamble’s (1999) use of the term “complicated”. Gamble uses “complicated”
to describe human cultures and “complex” to describe the less-sophisticated Neanderthal cultures.
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to emerge as a complement to trading, which served humanity by increasing our fertility and
as a consequence, population.
Why has the evolution of human speech been so puzzling? One difficulty stems from
the fact that human speech relies on neural mechanisms that in present day humans involve
parts of the brain that also play a part in motor control, emotion and higher cognition. The
apparent result of speech and neural abilities being so intertwined creates two identification
problems. First, if an activity was suggested to be an evolutionary driver, how do we know it
would have led to developments in speech as opposed to neural abilities (or both)? That is,
how do we know the variable I in our model relates to speech and not intelligence? Second,
the contribution of human speech to biological fitness would seem to entail most anything
anyone can think about, resulting in an identification problem for the causative activity: it is
a challenge to relate the evolution of language to any isolated activity like trade.
But focusing on speech and neural abilities confuses matters. While it is the case that
higher-order brain function is required for speech, not all higher-order brain functions rely
on speech. Many neural investments came earlier, presumably in conjunction with tool-
making, and would have supported primitive speech (see the citations in footnote 2). Other
neural investments were made at or around the time of speech evolution (footnote 10). But
those investments alone would not have directly improved speech capabilities beyond proto-
speech because these capabilities were morphologically-limited. The morphology of speech
(i.e., physical changes in the SVT) was costly, and its only use is for speech. This morphol-
ogy most likely evolved specifically for speech, with the benefits stemming from the primary
function of speech—improved communication.
The co-evolutionary problem is therefore an economic problem. It is from this perspec-
tive that we address the identification problems. The first identification problem is mitigated
by focusing on the morphology of speech and the associated costs (unlike prior research).
We define the tradeoffs associated with I in accordance with those directly associated with
SVT morphology, as this was the limiting feature of speech. A broader interpretation of our
model could be that I represents both morphology and intelligence, provided the net costs
and net benefits of these two investments are consistent with our specification. Some costs
will be the same for the human SVT and intelligence, but some key differences exist. We
have modeled greater speech capabilities to result in greater human mortality, less power and
consequently less productivity, and greater birth rates. Robson and Kaplan (2003) argue the
opposite relationship holds for intelligence and mortality: greater intelligence coevolved with
less mortality because longevity is required to yield a return on the knowledge investment that
comes from greater intelligence. Similarly, an opposite relation may arise between intelli-
gence and productivity. While brainpower might divert energy from muscles, Robson (2005)
notes that intelligence is also needed for effective hunting. If we were modeling brainpower
investments the effect would in all likelihood be ambiguous, with a possible productivity
advantage going to smarter people—the opposite of what occurs in our model. There may
also be an opposite relation between intelligence and birth rates, as energy required for
increased brainpower may be diverted from reproduction. Finally, on the benefit side, with
more speech one should have reduced transactions costs of trade. Would greater intelligence
reduce transactions costs? Not necessarily, if the trader could not speak—again the end result
is ambiguous. Still, we admit it is difficult to separate out all the processes that drove the
evolution of speech and brain function. Trade-speech co-evolution could have certainly played
a role in neural investments, but so could have many other things.
The second identification problem is assuaged by recognizing that the driving co-
evolutionary activity (or activities) must be associated with communication. This is not a
new insight, as nearly all prior research into this problem focuses on one activity associated
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with communication. We focus on trade, which has previously not been formally modeled
within this context, and examine this as the trade-off between morphology costs and benefits.
It is possible a single activity such as trade could have gotten the ball rolling, and after that
there would have been increased benefits from improved communication in a wide range of
activities, e.g., mating, hunting.
Another difficulty in identifying the behavior is a lack of behavioral evidence in the archae-
ological record during this time period. This is a problem for all behavioral explanations,
but particularly for trade which is a uniquely human activity that does not arise to a similar
extent in other primate systems. Direct evidence of what many people think of as human
trade currently goes back about 150,000 years (though evidence of modern human behaviors
prior to this time continues to be uncovered; McBrearty and Stringer 2007). Ofek (2001)
makes the case that earlier forms of trade have not received adequate attention. Both Ofek
(2001) and Isaac (1983) argue that food-sharing, a known practice among even the earliest
Homo lineages, is a basic process of resource redistribution—one of the earliest forms of
market exchange. Ofek suggests some degree of specialization and exchange came to be
involved in tool-making and other activities, even among early hominids. While we do not
specify the exact nature of exchange in our model, implicitly our exchange environment can
be rudimentary and fall somewhere on the spectrum between food-sharing/tool-making and
more widespread trade.
Our model frames one potential path that this pre-history/pre-evidence co-evolutionary
world might have taken—one that accounts for the interaction of biological and economic
institutions. Our model addresses the potential co-evolutionary tradeoffs associated with a
particular cooperative behavior, trade, and nature’s investments in the morphology of speech.
Prior theories have also addressed co-evolutionary linkages between speech and behavior
(including trade), though most of these theories do not formalize the evolutionary dynamics
as we do. In particular, prior work involving trade has not involved a formal model. We have
tried to shift the focus to these issues.
At the present time, the complete validity of this world is beyond empirical verification
from field data. And obviously simulation models are never useful as “proof” of the occur-
rence of a certain historic trajectory—they can only be used to evaluate whether certain
trajectories are feasible, and whether model outcomes are consistent with stylized facts as
currently understood. In this sense the contribution of social scientists to “paleo-puzzles” is
complementary to the evidence-driven approaches in the natural sciences and archaeology.
Nevertheless, we believe the model might also be useful to advance the search for new
evidence. First, outcomes may help frame where and how to uncover more evidence on the
interaction of social and natural systems, e.g., trade, coordination, specialization. Second,
the results suggest there is scope for a series of interesting experiments in the laboratory. Lab
experiments studying the use of a novel language within coordination games are becoming
more common-place (see, e.g., Galantucci 2005; Selten and Warglien 2007). But for the most
part these experiments assume all players are capable of producing language and they need to
coordinate on a code; the more complicated the code, the more costly. What we are proposing
instead is a set of experiments in which the evolution of language can be studied in which the
existence of exchange institutions and degree of trade are the treatment variables. While we
would not of course be able to simulate biological evolution, we could capture the rates of
language development within and outside exchange institutions. That said, researchers would
still be left with the challenge of working backwards to connect language development with
speech morphology, but with more information about behavior within institutions to guide
their search.
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